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COMMENTS

CONTEMPT POWER AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS:
THE NEW TREND
I.

INTRODUCTION

The inherent power of a court to punish contempt can be traced
back to the beginning of our judicial system.' The United States Supreme Court recognized this power as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789, noting that the act provides that "all courts of the United States
shall have the power . . . to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the
discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or
hearing before the same."'
The Supreme Court's ruling in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, 3 however, has brought into controversy the

issue of whether bankruptcy judges have contempt power." This issue
has arisen primarily because bankruptcy courts are created pursuant to
article I of the United States Constitution5 rather than through article
111.6 Bankruptcy courts, therefore, do not fall within the classic definition of courts as created by the Constitution.' Article III judges enjoy
lifetime tenure8 and a salary which may not be diminished during their
I.

See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); United

States v. Hudson, II U.S. 32 (1812); see also 2 W. COLLIER, ON BANKRUPTCY 1 105.03, at

105-07 (15th ed. 1985).
2. Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 510 (1873); see also Frankfurter & Landis,
Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1023 (1924).
3. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
4. See Ferriell, Core Proceedings in Bankruptcy Court, 56 UMKC L. REV. 47 (1987); Leal,
Powers of the Bankruptcy Courts: Section 105, 29 S. TEx. L.J. 487 (1988); Note, In re Krisle:
Civil Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court, 31 S.D. L. REV. 273 (1986); Feder & Feder,
Bankruptcy Law: Disputed Contempt Power Supported by High Court Rulings, Nat'l L.J., Apr.
25, 1988, at 26.
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
6. Id. art. III, § 1.
7. Black's Law Dictionary defines "Constitutional Court" as "[a] court named or described
and expressly protected by Constitution, or recognized by name or definite description in Constitution (e.g. Supreme Court, as provided for in Art. 1II, Sec. I of U.S. Const.) in contrast to legislatively created courts. Commonly referred to as 'Article Ill' courts in reference to U.S. Const."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (5th ed. 1979).
8. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1.
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term in office. 9 Bankruptcy judges, on the other hand, are appointed for
a term of fourteen years'0 and Congress has the authority to increase
or decrease their salaries." Since a bankruptcy court's power comes
from Congress instead of article III of the Constitution, it is questionable whether they have the same power over certain matters traditionally belonging to article III courts.
The source of this controversy is the Supreme Court's decision in
Northern Pipeline.2 The Court in Northern Pipeline invalidated the
broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction given to bankruptcy courts
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978"1 (hereinafter the "1978
Act") as a violation of separation of powers.' Although the Court did
not address the issue of contempt power,15 its decision to invalidate section 1471 of title 28 in the United States Code has sparked controversy
over whether bankruptcy courts have the power to issue final contempt
orders."
This dispute over whether bankruptcy judges have contempt power
involves constitutional and statutory issues. The first issue is whether a
bankruptcy court may constitutionally issue orders of contempt without
having to certify facts and conclusions of law to the district court. At
least one court has relied on Northern Pipeline in holding that this
power is unconstitutional in the hands of a bankruptcy court.' 7 Another
decision has held that exercise of contempt power by a bankruptcy
court does not violate the Constitution because such power was vested
in bankruptcy courts even before the passage of the 1978 Act. 8 On the
other hand, some legal scholars believed that subsequent Supreme

9. Id.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1986).
I1. Id. § 154.
12. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 50.
13. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101).
14. See infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. See Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir. 1983) (Northern Pipeline decision raises serious doubts about a bankruptcy court's authority to issue civil contempt orders); see
also Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds the Emergency, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1983);
King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath Of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1983); Vihon, Delegation of Authority and the Model Rule: The
Continuing Saga of Northern Pipeline, 88 COMMERCIAL L.J. 64 (1983).
17. See In re Cox Cotton Co., 24 Bankr. 930 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1982), vacated sub. nom.,
732 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984).
18. See In re Johns-Mansville Corp., 26 Bankr. 919, 924 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (there is
nothing unconstitutional in the grant of contempt power to bankruptcy courts because every court
has inherent power to stay proceedings in order to control the disposition of cases on its docket.
Any conduct which disrupts or threatens the inherent power of a court to control proceedings or to
maintain the dignity and efficiency of the judicial process should be punished by that court).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/6
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Court decisions' 9 have modified Northern Pipeline, and thus bankruptcy judges are not constitutionally prohibited from exercising the
power of contempt." The Supreme Court's most recent ruling relating
back to the hard-line
to the issue, however, may produce a reversion
21
principles of the Northern Pipeline decision.
The second issue is whether a bankruptcy court has statutory authority to issue final contempt orders. There is a split in the federal
courts over this issue. In the decision In re Sequoia Auto Brokers,22 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that contempt power is not available to bankruptcy courts because article I courts must derive all power
expressly from Congress, and that no such power has been expressly
granted to bankruptcy courts. 2 a In re Walters,24 a decision handed
down by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that the plain language of section 105(a) of title 11 in the United States Code confers
contempt power upon bankruptcy courts in the absence of express restriction upon such power.2 1 Still some lower courts have held that contempt power is inherent in all courts, and therefore, bankruptcy judges
power in the absence of any specific statutory
possess contempt
26
proscription.
This comment will discuss recent developments regarding the issue
of contempt power in the context of bankruptcy courts. The major focus will be on statutory and constitutional interpretations as to whether
bankruptcy judges are vested with contempt power. In addition to a
discussion of the emerging trend of authority, this area of the law will
be thoroughly analyzed.
II.

CONTEMPT

A party may generally be held in contempt for willfully disregarding or disobeying an order of the court in a way which frustrates the
administration of justice.2 According to one commentator, "[t]he word
'contempt' is a very old word to cover any act done in violation of a

19. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
20. Feder & Feder, supra note 4, at 26. Benjamin and Robert Feder suggested that the
Supreme Court had retreated somewhat from the hard line approach in Northern Pipeline and
had adopted more of an ad hoc approach to the problem as was endorsed by Justice White's
dissent in that opinion. Id. at 27.
21. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (interim ed. 1989).
22. 827 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987).
23. Id. at 1289.
24. 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989).
25. Id. at 669.
26. In re Miller, 81 Bankr. 669 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
27. See Beale, Contempt Of Court, Criminal And Civil, 21 HARv. L. REV. 161 (1908).
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direct order of the king or of any governmental process." 28 The most
common form of contempt is contempt of court.29
Contempt of court may be either civil or criminal in nature. Although a single contemptuous act may give rise to both civil and criminal sanctions, the key to determining the character of the contempt
usually lies in the purpose behind the sanction being imposed.3" Criminal contempt is primarily punitive and is imposed for the purpose of
vindicating the authority of the court.3" The purposes of civil contempt,
on the other hand, are to compensate the aggrieved party and to coerce
the party in contempt to comply with a previously decreed court order.3 2 The nature of a contempt order may become important because
it determines whether the contempt decree will survive invalidation of
the underlying order. A civil contempt sanction does not survive invalidation of the underlying decree because at that point there is no reason
to coerce the disobedient party to act or to compensate an aggrieved
party. 3 If a contempt is criminal, on the other hand, the decree will
stand despite invalidation of the underlying order because nullification
of the order has little to do with vindicating the authority of the
court.34 In Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co.,3 5 the United
States Supreme Court stated that the key distinction between civil and
criminal contempt is that civil contempt proceedings are viewed as part
of the original cause of action between the parties, not as independent
actions.3" Criminal contempt proceedings, however, stand collateral to
whatever cause of action originally brought the parties to court. 37 Thus
the dispute in criminal contempt is no longer between the parties, but

28. Id. at 161.
29. Id.
30. For a general background on the differences between criminal and civil contempt, see
Fink, Basic Issues in Civil Contempt, 8 N.M.L. REV. 55 (1977-78); Martineau, Contempt of
Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677
(1981).
31. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947); see also 9 H. REMINGTON,

A

TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW

§ 3527, at 144 (6th ed. 1955) (actions giving

rise to criminal contempt in bankruptcy proceedings include willful failure of a bankrupt to appear before a referee after receiving an order for examination, blatantly false testimony, or inducing a witness not to appear for examination).
32. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1966); Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932).
Civil contempt proceedings in a bankruptcy case are instituted by a private individual or the
trustee in bankruptcy on behalf of parties individually interested in the bankruptcy estate, as part
of the bankruptcy proceedings. 9 H. REMINGTON,supra note 31, § 3528, at 145.
33. Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1341 (3d Cir. 1976).
34. Id.
35. 284 U.S. 448 (1932).
36. Id. at 452.
37. Id. at 453.
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rather between the contemnor and the court.3"

In the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the same principles as
those used in other courts are relied upon in determining the nature
and elements of a contemptuous act.3 9 Civil contempt proceedings in a
bankruptcy case are instituted by a private individual or a trustee in
bankruptcy on behalf of the interested parties as part of the bankruptcy proceeding itself.40 On the other hand, if the offence involves
action prohibited by the bankruptcy court, the contempt is necessarily
criminal, instituted by the court itself and for the purpose of vindicating the authority of the court."1
III.

STATUTORY HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS' POWER OF
CONTEMPT

Vesting of contempt power in the bankruptcy courts originated
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (hereinafter the "1898 Act").'2
Under the 1898 Act, the district court served as the bankruptcy court,
referring bankruptcy cases to a bankruptcy referee who performed minor administrative duties. 3 The referee did not have power to issue
final orders, but merely certified all facts and conclusions of law to the
district court."" Referees were appointed for a term of two years 4 and
received compensation on a commission fee basis.46 The referee could
not issue final orders of contempt, but would rather certify possible
contemptuous actions to the district judge if a party refused to obey a
writ, process, or order.' 7 Thus, bankruptcy referees under the 1898 Act

38. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range, 221 U.S. 418, 445 (1911). The Supreme Court in
Gompers stated that "when the prisoners carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets ...
the action is essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties." Id.
39. 9 H. REMINGTON, supra note 31, § 3531, at 151 (citing In re Mayer, 98 F. 839, 842

(1900)).
40. Id. § 3528, at 145.
41. United States ex. rel. Paleais v. Moore, 294 F. 852 (2d Cir. 1923) (holding bankrupt in
criminal contempt for willful failure to turn over his various assets to the receiver); see also In re
Guzzardi, 74 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1935) (bankrupt debtor cited for criminal contempt after inducing
witness not to appear for examination); In re McIntosh, 73 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1934) (criminal
contempt held for willful failure of bankrupt to appear before a referee in response to an order for
his examination); In re Davoli, 28 F.2d 87 (D. Pa. 1928) (flagrantly false testimony by bankrupt
resulted in criminal contempt).
42. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. §
45 (1952)). For a detailed history of the bankruptcy courts of the United States, see H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1977); Merrick, Constitutional Chaos: Rodrock v. Security
Industrial Bank; Thorp Finance Corp. v. Gifford, 2 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 167 (1982).
43. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541 § 34, 30 Stat. 555.
44. Id. § 41(b), 30 Stat. 556.
45. Id. § 34(a)(1), 30 Stat. 555 (formerly codified 11 U.S.C. § 62 (1952).
46. Id. § 40(a), 30 Stat. 556 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 68 (1940)).
47. 9 H. REMINGTON, supra note 31, § 3524, at 142 (referee in bankruptcy had no jurisdiction to punish for contempts, not being a judge or court).
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had no contempt power despite the fact they were statutorily recognized as judicial officers.4 8 Although Congress gradually expanded their
powers in the first half of the 20th century,4 9 referees were still required to certify contemptuous findings to the district court.5 0
The contempt power of bankruptcy referees was finally expanded
in 1973 when the United States Supreme Court circulated the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (hereinafter the "Rules"). 5 ' The Rules replaced
the General Orders of Bankruptcy which had previously governed practice in cases filed under the 1898 Act. 52 Under the Rules bankruptcy
referees were renamed as bankruptcy judges5" in order to emphasize
"the judicial, in contradistinction to the ministerial functions of the referee in bankruptcy and administration"'15 and to "enhance the dignity
of the office as that of principal judge of the bankruptcy court."' 55 The
Rules also directly addressed the issue of contempt power.5 6 Bankruptcy judges were granted the authority to issue contempt citations
except those requiring imprisonment or fines in excess of $250.51 For
contempt decrees -warranting such penalties, bankruptcy judges were
required to certify the facts and conclusions of law of the case to the
district court.5 8
IV.

CONTEMPT POWER AND THE

1978

ACT

59

Congress passed the 1978 Act which completely restructured the
entire bankruptcy system.6" In each federal judicial district, the 1978
Act established a United States Bankruptcy Court as an adjunct to the

48. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541 § 41, 30 Stat. 556.
Under the 1898 Act, bankruptcy referees were also required to take the same oaths of office
as United States judges. Id. § 36, 30 Stat. 555.
49. See Bankruptcy Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575. 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (transferred administrative duties from bankruptcy referee to a clerk or trustee); see also Bankruptcy Act of 1946,
ch. 512, §§ 2, 6, 60 Stat. 323, 324, 326-27 (1946) (guaranteed bankruptcy referees a six-year
term and a salary).
50. See 9 H. REMINGTON, supra note 31 § 3524, at 142.
51. 415 U.S. 1003 (1974). The Supreme Court passed these rules pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2075 (1972), which had granted the Court the power to prescribe the practice and procedure of
bankruptcy cases.
52. For a general discussion of the General Orders In Bankruptcy, see REMINGTON, REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY (revised ed. 1961).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2075.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020(a), reprinted in 13 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
(14th ed. 1977).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101).
60. See Eisen & Smrtnik, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-An Elevated Judiciary, 28
DE PAUL L. REV. 1007 (1979).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/6
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federal court for the particular district."' Bankruptcy judges were appointed to office for a term of fourteen years, subject to removal by the
judicial council of the circuit on grounds of incompetence, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability.6 2 Salaries for bankruptcy judges were set by statute, subject to adjustment by Congress. 3
The 1978 Act gave sweeping powers to the bankruptcy courts.6 '
Section 1471 of title 28 eliminated the distinction between "summary ' 6 5 and "plenary"6 6 jurisdiction and granted jurisdiction over all
civil proceedings arising under title 11 to bankruptcy courts.6 7 Under
of a bankruptcy court were subject only to the
the 1978 Act, all orders
"clearly erroneous ' 'e8 standard of appellate review. 9
Although the 1978 Act did not directly address the issue of contempt, one could have determined that bankruptcy courts were vested
with contempt power through the construction of three statutes. First,
section 401 of title 28 in the United States Code, which provides for
contempt power in courts created pursuant to article III, states:
A court of the United States shall have [the] power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none
others, as - 1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; 2) Misbehavior of
any of its officers in their official transactions; 3) Disobedience or70resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
Second, section 105(a) of title 11 permits a bankruptcy court to issue
"any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title."' 71 Finally, section 1481 of title 28
allowed a bankruptcy judge to punish for criminal contempt only if the
contemptuous act was committed in the judge's presence.72
One commentator argued that a broad interpretation of section
105(a) of title 11 together with a reading of section 1481 of title 28 as

28 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Id. § 153 (a)-(b).
28 Id. § 154.
28 Id. § 1471.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "summary jurisdiction" as "[tlhe jurisdiction of a court
judgment or make an order itself forthwith; e.g., to commit to prison for contempt."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1287.
66. Black's Law Dictionary defines "plenary jurisdiction" as "[flull and complete jurisdiction or power of a court over the subject matter as well as the parties to a controversy." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1039.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b).
68. FED. R. Clv. P. 52(a).
69. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55-56 (1982).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
71.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
to give a
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a mere limitation on a bankruptcy court's power of contempt - a
power which, according to that commentator, is inherent in all other
courts of the United States - appeared to give a bankruptcy judge
much leeway in enforcing his orders."3 According to another authority
on bankruptcy "[b]y virtue of the Reform Act, the Bankruptcy Court
[] becomes a 'court of the United States,' and thus it has certain inherent powers to punish for contempts, although Congress may limit these
74
powers."
In its passage of the 1978 Act, Congress chose to regulate bankruptcy matters under article I of the Constitution, rather than pursuant
to its power to establish inferior courts under article III. 75 Under the
guise of the 1978 Act, some bankruptcy courts imposed large fines and
76
imprisoned parties judged to have been in contempt.
V.

NORTHERN PIPELINE AND AFTERMATH

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 77 created controversy over
whether a bankruptcy court has constitutional power and statutory authority to issue final contempt orders. 71 In Northern Pipeline, the
debtor corporation filed a petition for reorganization in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota, and shortly
thereafter filed a claim for breach of contract in the same court. 79 At
the heart of the controversy was the broad grant of jurisdiction given to
the bankruptcy court under section 1471 of title 28.80 The Supreme
Court noted -the Congressional authority to vest certain functions in
adjuncts to article III courts, 81 but ruled that this broad grant of jurisdiction unconstitutionally violated the separation of powers clause in
the United States Constitution.82 A four-justice plurality reasoned:

73.

See Note, supra note 4, at 278.

74.

W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.31 (1983).
75. Feder & Feder, supra note 4, at 26; see supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. For a
good discussion of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, see Countryman,
Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference and
the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7-12 (1985). But cf. Norton & Lieb, Ending
the Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Dilemma-An Article III Bankruptcy Approach, 67 JUDICATURE
346 (1984).
76. See, e.g., In re Crabtree, 39 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (ordering a $1000
fine per day up to a maximum of $10,000 and thereafter imprisonment); In re Myers, 18 Bankr.
362 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982) ($10,000 fine levied for violation of discharge injunction).
77. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
78. Feder & Feder, supra note 4, at 26.
79. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 56.
80. Id. at 56-57; see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
81. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 78-81.
82. Id. at 87.
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[t]he restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of
the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract
damages that is at issue in this case. The former may well be a 'public
right'[], but the latter obviously is not.83
Thus the Court expressed the view that section 1471 conferred powers
84
specifically reserved to article III courts to a non-article III adjunct.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the concurring opinion, concluding
that even the greatest protraction of a bankruptcy court's powers could
not include a set of claims "for breach of contract, misrepresentation,
and other counts which are of the stuff of the traditional actions at
common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789. "85 In his opinion, Rehnquist did, however, express disagreement with the majority's
stern approach."6
Justice White's dissenting opinion claimed that the majority's
hard-line approach was unworkable, and that the issue required an ad
hoc approach in determining whether the scheme of Congress accommodated the values of article III or substantially undermined them."'
The Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline made no mention of a
bankruptcy court's power to issue contempt citations since this question
was not at issue in the case.88 Thus, the question of whether bankruptcy judges are vested with contempt power was left open by the
decision. Some courts have read the decision broadly enough to conclude that contempt power is excluded from the realm of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. 9 Others have held that the Northern Pipeline decision does not preclude bankruptcy courts from issuing final
contempt orders.90
The Northern Pipeline decision forced Congress to pass new legislation regarding the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. In 1984, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments And Federal Judgeship Act
(hereinafter BAFJA) 91 in an attempt to cure the constitutional

83. Id.at 71.
84. Id. at 87.
85. Id. at 90.
86. Id. at 91.
87. Id. at 115.
88. Id. at 87.
89. See, e.g., In re Cox Cotton Co., 24 Bankr. 930, 947 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1982) (bankruptcy courts are not constitutionally vested with contempt power).
90. See, e.g., In re Johns-Mansville Corp., 26 Bankr. 919, 923-24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(there is no constitutional prohibition upon the assertion of contempt power by bankruptcy
courts).
91. Bankruptcy Amendments And Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1986).
For further explanation of BAFJA, see Chatz & Schumm, 1984 Bankruptcy Code Amendments
- Fresh from the Anvil, 89 COMMERCIAL L.J. 317 (1984); Countryman, supra note 75; Ferraro,
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problems of the 1978 Act. BAFJA limited a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to resolve issues unrelated to the bankruptcy proceeding
through the adoption of a "core" and "non-core" proceedings
distinction.92
One section of BAFJA grants district courts the authority to refer
bankruptcy cases to their respective bankruptcy courts.93 Upon referral,
bankruptcy judges have jurisdiction to hear and rule on all cases arising under title 11,1" as well as all "core" proceedings arising under the
bankruptcy code. 95 BAFJA also permits bankruptcy judges to issue final orders with regard to core proceedings arising under title 11, subject to conventional appeal. 96 However, if an action is a "non-core" proceeding with respect to an underlying bankruptcy proceeding, the
bankruptcy judge may only submit a proposed ruling to the district
court for de novo review. 97 Thus, if contempt proceedings are held to be
core proceedings, the bankruptcy court may issue a final, binding contempt citation.9 8 On the other hand, if contempt proceedings are
deemed as non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy court must certify
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo
review. 99

The Bankruptcy Act of 1984: Is It a Crown, or a Crown of Thorns?, II W.ST. UL. REV. 153
(1984).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1986).
93. Id. § 157(a).
94. See generally II U.S.C. § 101-151326 (1982) (setting out the law for the most common form of bankruptcy).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b); see also Ferriell, supra note 4, at 47.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1); See In re Caldwell, No. 87-10183, 87-3927 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1988) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file) (settlement agreement between the parties was part of
a "core" proceeding in bankruptcy and thus squarely within the original jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court); In re Total Transp., Inc., 87 Bankr. 568, 573 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (action to
collect pre-petition accounts receivable where those receivables make up the major assets of the
estate in liquidation is as close as one can get to a traditional type of "core" proceeding in bankruptcy); In re Wedtech Corp., 81 Bankr. 237, 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (determination as to
the existence of a fraudulent conveyance was integral to the administration of the bankruptcy
estate and thus a "core" proceeding): In re Kreiss, 58 Bankr. 999, 1005 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(action to claim property which the debtor alleges he became entitled to acquire within 180 days
after filing bankruptcy petition is a sufficiently close nexus to the bankruptcy estate to be considered a "core" proceeding in which the bankruptcy judge may issue a final judgment).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1); John E. Burns Drilling Co. v. Central Bank of Denver, 739 F.2d
1489 (10th Cir. 1984) (non-core proceedings include civil proceedings that, in the absence of a
petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or state court); Littles v. Lieberman, 90 Bankr. 700, 705 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (debt collection letter which allegedly violates a state law is a state cause of action and a non-core proceeding with respect to the bankruptcy case); In re American Community Servs., 86 Bankr. 681, 688 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988)
(suits between third parties affecting the administration of the bankruptcy estate are non-core
proceedings).
98. See Ferriell, supra note 4, at 96.
99. Id.
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The most recently enacted law in response to Northern Pipeline
concerning this issue is section 9020 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,1 00 specifically adopted by the Supreme Court and
approved by Congress on August 1, 1987.10' Rule 9020 authorizes a
bankruptcy court to determine summarily a contempt committed in the
presence of the court.10 2 However, with regard to a contemptuous act
committed outside the court's presence, the judge may only issue a contempt order after a hearing on notice.' 0 3 If a bankruptcy judge makes
this determination after the hearing, the bankruptcy court may then
issue a contempt order.' 0" The party found in contempt must then object to the order within ten days in order to obtain review by the district court. 0 5 The Rule does not state whether the bankruptcy court's
finding is subject to a hearing de novo'0 6 by the district court or
whether it is appealable only under the narrow, clearly erroneous standard. 10 7 Some courts, however, hold that Rule 9020 does not vest bankruptcy courts with contempt power stating that the Rule merely authorizes the courts to determine contempt as opposed to issuing a final
contempt order.' 0 8 Other courts interpret Rule 9020 as recognizing
contempt power in bankruptcy courts or as a mere limitation on the
inherent power to adjudge contempt. 9

100. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020, reprinted in W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 257 (pamphlet
ed. pt. 2, 1988).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 9020(a).
103. Id. at 9020(b).
104. Id.
105. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020(b) reads as follows:
(b) Other Contempt: Contempt committed in a case or proceeding pending before a bankruptcy judge, except when determined as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule, may be
determined by the bankruptcy judge only after a hearing on notice. This notice shall be in
writing, shall state the essential facts constituting the contempt charged and describe the
contempt as criminal or civil and shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a
reasonable time for the preparation of the defense. The notice may be given on the court's
own initiative or an application of the U.S. Attorney, or by an attorney appointed to the
court for that purpose. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a
bankruptcy judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the hearing except with the
consent of the person charged.
106. Black's Law Dictionary defines "hearing de novo" as "a new hearing or a hearing for
the second time, contemplating an entire trial in same manner in which matter was originally
heard and a review of previous hearing. On hearing 'de novo' court hears matter as court of
original and not appellate jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 649.
107. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020(b).
108. See, e.g., In re Stein And Day, Inc., 83 Bankr. 221, 225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(Rule 9020 merely authorizes bankruptcy judges to "determine" contempt).
109. See, e.g., In re Skinner, 90 Bankr. 470, 475 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988) (noting that bankruptcy judges possess inherent contempt powers); In re Miller, 81 Bankr. 669, 678 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1988) (Rule 9020 is a mere limitation on an already inherent power of contempt); In re
Reed, I I Bankr. 258, 261 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) ("It was early determined that bankruptcy
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

At issue in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe

Line Co. 110 was the constitutionality of section 1471 of title 28, which
granted bankruptcy courts the power to hear and issue final decisions in
all civil matters related to bankruptcy cases.' The Northern Pipeline
decision declared this section unconstitutional, based on the premise
that it impermissibly violated the separation of powers doctrine." 2 The
Supreme Court held that the 1978 Act "has impermissibly removed
most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from
the Article III district court, and has vested those attributes in a nonArticle III adjunct,"' 113 thus encroaching upon the essential independence of the judiciary." 4 The decision did not address the constitutionality of a bankruptcy court's exercise of contempt power," 5 but a restrictive interpretation of the decision could lead to such a finding."'
Ironically, the case which mounts the strongest opposition to the
constitutionality of bankruptcy courts' exercise of contempt power, In
re Cox Cotton,"7 relies very little on the Northern Pipeline decision. In

Cox Cotton, the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
ruled that contempt power is derived from the judicial power of the
United States under the Constitution and "cannot be inherited from
thin air.""' 8 The Cox Cotton decision therefore held that bankruptcy
judges, due to their reducible salary and lack of lifetime tenure, may
not wield article III powers, " nor may Congress, in creating bankruptcy courts under article I, empower bankruptcy judges with such
authority." 0
Some courts have followed the reasoning of the Cox Cotton decision primarily due to the concern of smothering the distinction between
article I legislative courts and traditional article III courts, which many
courts, as courts of equity, even without statutory authorization, possessed this [contempt]
power").
110. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Ill. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982).
112. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 336-402 (11 th ed. 1985).
113. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 50.
116. See, e.g.. In re Cox Cotton Co., 24 Bankr. 930, 950 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1982), vacated
sub. nom., 732 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984). Because Cox Cotton was
decided in 1982, it questioned the constitutionality of the contempt power under the 1978 Code,
prior to the 1984 Amendments Act.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.at 951.
120. Id.at 952-54.
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believe would be the result of allowing a non-article III entity to exercise contempt power.121 There is also the fear that an article I entity,
since it is not wholly independent of the legislature, may be more likely
to usurp such an "awesome power, '"12 which is arbitrary and open to
123
abuse.
Conversely, several other courts have declined to follow the reasoning set forth in the Cox Cotton decision. 2 " In In re Kalpana Electronics, Inc.,'2 5 the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of New York
held there are no constitutional impediments to issuance of contempt
sanctions by a bankruptcy court. 126 The Kalpana court believed that
the assertion that article I courts may not issue contempt orders ignores
the fact that bankruptcy judges had limited contempt power under the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure even before the enactment of the 1978
Act. 1 2 7 This authority, the court stated, was not the product of inadvertence because Justice Douglas had vigorously objected to it at the time
of the enactment of those Rules. 28 The Kalpana court concluded that
bankruptcy judges may constitutionally be vested with contempt power
but declined to take a hard stance on the issue and thus certified its

121. See, e.g., In re Omega Equipment Corp., 51 Bankr. 569 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985); see
also Brief of Thomas Krattenmaker at 12-14, 19-42, In re Magwood, 785 F. 2d 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1986). Professor Krattenmaker asserts that bankruptcy judges have no more inherent powers to
issue contempt citations than they did prior to the 1984 Act. Id. at 13.
122. See In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, 827 F.2d 1281, 1285 (citing Ex Parte Terry, 128
U.S. 289 (1888)).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., In re Colorado Energy Supply, 728 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92) (White, J., dissenting) (bankruptcy courts are precluded
from deciding traditional state-common law actions related only peripherally to an adjudication of
bankruptcy under federal law); In re Goodman, 81 Bankr. 786, 794 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1986)
(widely held that bankruptcy courts have inherent contempt power to enforce their orders), modified, 90 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1988), affirmed in part, rev'd in part, 873 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.
1989); In re Haddad, 68 Bankr. 944, 953 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (a bankruptcy court's power to
sanction for abuse of process is constitutional and therefore "it would border on legal hallucination" to hold that bankruptcy courts may not exercise civil contempt powers); Kellogg v. Chester,
71 Bankr. 36, 37 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (statutory grant of contempt power to bankruptcy
courts is constitutional); In re Better Homes Of Virginia, 52 Bankr. 426, 430-31 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985) (bankruptcy court had power to issue contempt citations in order to protect administration
of the bankruptcy code, and that Northern Pipeline only prohibited a bankruptcy from resolving
state issues), affd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986); In re McLean Industries, 68
Bankr. 690, 695 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (power of bankruptcy court to issue an order for civil
contempt is derived from three sources: The inherent power of a court, including an article I
court; the reference of the inherent power of the district court; and the statutory grant contained
in II U.S.C. section 105).
125. 58 Bankr. 326 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
126. Id. at 332.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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findings to the district court.129
Certain legal scholars are not afraid to take such a position. Some
argue that even if Cox Cotton was correct in saying that "contempt
power . . . cannot be inherited from thin air,"' 130 the court erred in
"confining it within the ironclad article III parameter." ' 3 These scholars argue that it is imperative for Congress to have the ability to vest
some essential attributes of article III courts into those it has created
pursuant to article 1.132 Otherwise, every federal adjudicatory body
would be required to conform to the mandates of article III in order to
1 33
render final decisions.
The United States Supreme Court's concern regarding an overbroad reading of Northern Pipeline was indicated in two of its subsequent decisions. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co.,13 the Court dismissed a challenge to the binding arbitration provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, despite the failure of that administrative scheme to fit within one of the
article I exceptions listed in Northern Pipeline.1 35 Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Thomas bears a strong resemblance to the concur1 36
ring opinion in which she joined in the Northern Pipeline decision. In
Thomas, the majority held that the Northern Pipeline ruling "establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-article III court the
power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in
of
a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent
137
review.
appellate
ordinary
to
only
subject
the litigants, and
The rigidity of Northern Pipeline was further weakened by the
Supreme Court decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. Schor.'3 8 In Schor, with Justice O'Connor again writing for the majority, the Court declared its reluctance to "adopt formalistic and unbending rules" 139 which might "unduly constrict Congress' ability to
take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers." 14
Justice O'Connor's opinion further stated that the "constitutionality of
a given congressional delegation of adjudicative functions to a non-Ar-

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 333.
Cox Cotton, 24 Bankr. at 950.
Feder &'Feder, supra note 4, at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
473 U.S. 568 (1985).
Id. at 573.
Compare Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571-94; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 89-92.
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584.
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
Id. at 846.
Id.
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ticle III body must be assessed by reference to the purposes underlying
the requirements of Article III. ''141 These purposes were to safeguard
the independence of the judiciary under the Constitution 142 and to protect the right of a litigant to have his claim decided by an adjudicatory
body free of political pressure from other branches of government." 3
The Court then reasoned that the adjudication of a common law counterclaim by an article I tribunal such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission did not impermissibly threaten the institutional integrity of the Judiciary."" The Schor decision therefore seemed to go
beyond the concurring opinion in Northern Pipeline, perhaps to the
point of endorsing the ad hoc approach advocated by Justice White's
dissent" 5 in Northern Pipeline.
Following the Thomas and Schor decisions, some authorities concluded that the hard-line approach of the Northern Pipeline decision
was virtually extinguished. 6 One commentator stated that the close
harmony between these decisions and Justice White's dissent "portend
a much-needed loosening of the self-created article III chains in which
many bankruptcy courts have wrapped themselves since the Northern
147
Pipeline decision.
The Supreme Court's most recent decision relating to the issue,
however, may serve as a deadening blow to the principles set forth in
the Thomas and Schor decisions. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg,14 8 the Court held that in a Chapter 11 action to avoid allegedly fraudulent conveyances, a party is entitled to a jury trial under the
seventh amendment, notwithstanding the statutory designation of a
fraudulent conveyance action as a "core" proceeding over which nonarticle III bankruptcy judges have jurisdiction. 14 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan further stated that when Congress enacted federal bankruptcy law, it did not create a new cause of action with new
and innovative remedies in order to cope with a public problem which
could not be combatted by traditional remedies. 5 Therefore, the Court
concluded, "Congress cannot eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial merely by relabeling the cause of action to which it
attaches and placing exclusive- jurisdiction in an administrative agency

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 582-83.
Id.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 846.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 115.
Feder & Feder, supra note 4 at 28.
Id.
109 S. Ct. 2782 (interim ed. 1989).
Id. at 2786; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (1986),
Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2800.
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or a specialized court of equity."' 5 1 The Court explicitly stated its intention to express no "view as to whether the Seventh Amendment or
Article III allows jury trials in such actions to be held before non-Article III bankruptcy judges subject to the oversight provided by the district courts . ..

.2

Justice White's dissent accused the majority of striking down a
federal statute and interpreting the seventh amendment incorrectly by
guaranteeing parties to a specialized non-article III forum the right to
a jury trial. 153 Moreover, White's dissent argued that the majority's
5
holding served to overturn the Court's decision in Katchen v. Landy.1 "
In Katchen, the Court was faced with the issue of whether a bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction to order the surrender of voidable preferences. 155 The petitioner argued that the question of whether
he was entitled to certain payments made prior to the filing of bankruptcy was a matter falling under his seventh amendment right to a
jury trial . 56 The Court, however, with Justice White writing for the
majority,-held that "as the proceedings of bankruptcy courts are inherently proceedings in equity, there is no Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial for determination of objections to claims . .. ."'I
The majority in Granfinancieraclaimed its decision did not overrule Katchen.158 As support for this contention, the majority noted that
the Katchen case was decided under the 1898 Act, which did not include actions to set aside voidable preferences. 59 Therefore, proceedings to recover fraudulent conveyances and to determine preferences
were deemed separate under the 1898 Act, and thus, the seventh
amendment did not apply.1 60
Justice White's dissent asserted that the majority "exploit[ed] the
circumstances" 1' ' under which Katchen was decided, and "place[d] a
straitjacket on Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause: a straitjacket designed in an era, as any reader of Dickens is aware, that was
not known for its enlightened thinking on debtor-creditor relations. '"'6 2
The dissent also addressed the possibility that the Court's decision

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 2802.
Id. at 2806.
382 U.S. 323 (1966).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2798.
Id. at 2794.
Id.
Id. at 2806.
Id. at 2815.
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may have invalidated a portion of section 157 of title 28, which defined
fraudulent conveyances as "core" proceedings.'6 3 Justice White first
stated that Congress should be given great deference in exercising its
express constitutional power over the laws of bankruptcy. 6, The majority had refused to defer because the "respondent has adduced no evidence that Congress considered the constitutional implications of its
designation of all fraudulent conveyance actions as core proceedings."'1 65 Justice White found error in this reasoning because there is no
requirement that Congress explain that it considered the constitutional
implications of its decision as a prerequisite for obtaining a court's deference on legislation.' 6 6
Regardless of the Supreme Court's decision in Granfinanciera,
since an adjudicatory body has inherent authority to hear and render
final orders regarding a dispute within its subject matter jurisdiction, 6 7
and contempt power is part of this inherent authority, 6 8 it should be of
no constitutional significance as to whether this adjudicatory body derives its power from article III or from Congress pursuant to article I.
Thus, it seems that as a matter of Congress' constitutional powers "[t]o
establish . . . uniform Laws [sic] on the subject of Bankruptcies,"' 69
[sic] bankruptcy courts may exercise the power of contempt without
fear of violating the separation of powers doctrine. In the future, it is
imperative for the Supreme Court to show more deference to Congress
with regard to its power to enact bankruptcy laws. If the Court does
otherwise, it would be engaging in outrageous judicial activism which
could frustrate the purposes of article I of the Constitution by inhibiting Congress from enacting effective bankruptcy legislation.
VII.

STATUTORY ISSUE

The most intensely debated issue regarding the bankruptcy courts'
exercise of contempt power focuses on statutory authority. Assuming
bankruptcy judges are not constitutionally prohibited from issuing final
contempt orders, questions arise as to whether there is statutory authority to exercise such power, and also, whether statutory authority is
even a prerequisite for the issuance of contempt orders by bankruptcy
70
courts.'

163. Id. at 2814.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2800.
166. Id. at 2814.
167. See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 509-10 (1873).
168. Id.
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
170. See United States v. Revie, 834 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir. 1987). In its opinion, the
Revie court acknowledged but declined to address the inconsistent federal court decisions, reason-
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According to the BAFJA, 171 passed in response to Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,' 7' a bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction is determined by the creation of a distinction be7 a Section 157(b) of title 28
tween "core" and "non-core" proceedings.
authorizes bankruptcy judges to hear and issue final orders in all
"core" proceedings. 7 4 Subdivision (b)(2) of section 157 provides an
enumerated list of core proceedings. 75 Although the list does not men176
In
tion contempt sanctions, it is not intended to be all-inclusive.
77
Wood v. Wood,1 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals defined core proceedings as those which 78could not exist in the absence of the bankruptcy proceeding itself.'
The statute does place restrictions on a bankruptcy court's power
with regard to "non-core" proceedings.' 79 If a proceeding is "non-core"
with respect to the underlying bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy judge
must certify his findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district

ing that the issue was beyond the case at hand.
171. Bankruptcy Amendments And Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 151
(1986).
172. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1986).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 157(b)(2). The enumerated list of core proceedings reads as follows:
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate; (B) allowance or disallowance of
claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of
claims or interest for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12 or 13 of title
II but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort
or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title
11; (C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate; (D)
orders in respect to obtaining credit; (E) orders to turn over property of the estate; (F)
proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences; (G) motions to terminate, annul or
modify the automatic stay; (H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances; (1) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts; (J) objections to
discharges; (K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens; (L) confirmations
of plans; (M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral; (N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate;
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the other assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity-security holder relationship, except personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims.
Id.
176. This.statute specifically states, "core proceedings include, but are not limited to ...
Id. Subsection (3) of the above states that bankruptcy judges "shall determine, on the judge's own
motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding under this
subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title 11." 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(3) (1986).
177. 825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987).
178. Id. at 96.
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
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court for a de novo hearing on such matters.1 80 Therefore, contempt
power must fall within the statutory definition of "core" matters in order for a bankruptcy court to issue a final contempt order.
The issue of a bankruptcy court's statutory authority to hold a
party in contempt has been the product of extensive judicial interpretation. 8 As labeled by one commentator, courts have taken three different views: the restrictive approach; 8 2 the expansive approach; 83 and
the inherent power approach. 8
Courts which follow the restrictive approach hold that bankruptcy
courts are not statutorily vested with contempt power. 185 The federal
appeals court that initially confronted the contempt power issue followed the restrictive approach. 188 In In re Sequoia Auto Brokers,8 7 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to read section 105(a) of title
11 and section 157(b) of title 29 as a sta tutory grant of contempt
power to bankruptcy courts.'8 8 The court held that contempt power
must be explicitly granted by statute in order for a bankruptcy court to
have authority to exercise it, and further added that: "If Congress had
intended that bankruptcy judges should possess such power, it well
knew how to confer it."' 89 The Sequoia decision has been subject to
much criticism since it failed to recognize that the threat of holding
parties in contempt is the only way the bankruptcy court can "put
teeth into its power to enforce [its orders]."' 19°
The only other circuit court of appeals to confront the issue, the
Fourth Circuit, has followed the expansive approach. In the decision In
re Walters, 9 ' with retired Supreme Court Justice Powell writing for
the majority, the court held that a bankruptcy court's authority to exercise the power of contempt may be found within the plain meaning of
section 105(a) of title 11.192 The statute allows the bankruptcy court to
"issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this title.' 93 The Walters decision noted
the reasoning set forth in Sequoia, but stated that "we think it insuffi-

180. Id.
181. See infra notes 183-203.
182. See Leal, supra note 4, at 487.
183. Id. at 509.
184. Id. at 510.
185. See infra note 209.
186. See In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1289.
189. Id. at 1290.
190. In re Crum, 55 Bankr. 455, 458 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
191. 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989).
192. Id. at 669.
193. I1 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1986).
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cient to overcome the plain language of the statute and the fact that
former section 1481 of the Code, repealed by the 1984 amendments,
rather plainly conferred civil contempt power upon bankruptcy courts
without expressly restricting it."' 9
Perhaps the court which has done the most extensive analysis of
the expansive approach is the bankruptcy court for the Middle District
of Florida in the decision In re Miller. 95 The Miller decision reasoned
that since the granting of a discharge to a debtor is one of the most
fundamental aspects of bankruptcy law, it "defies logic to conclude that
.. . the rights of a discharged debtor cannot be protected by the very
[b]ankruptcy [c]ourt which issued the discharge."'19 This reasoning is
consistent with the rationale set out by the United States Supreme
Court in Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co. 9' In Leman, the
Court proposed that contempt actions are part of the original cause of
action between the parties.' 9 8
The Miller decision further advocated the use of the inherent
power approach.' 99 This alternative line of reasoning in Miller relied on
the United States Supreme Court's recognition of an inherent power of
courts to impose sanctions for abuse of litigation practices.2 0u The
Miller court also considered the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure of 1973.01
In Boyd v. Glucklik,0 2 the Eighth Circuit asserted that bankruptcy
courts were included among those courts vested with the inherent
power of enforcing their own binding orders through civil contempt. 0 '
Therefore, the Miller decision ruled that bankruptcy courts need no
statutory authorization in order to hold a party in contempt because
"all courts, whether created pursuant to Article I or Article III . . .
have inherent civil contempt power to enforce compliance with their

194. Walters, 868 F.2d at 669.
195. 81 Bankr. 669 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
196. Id. at 677; see also In re Industrial Tool Distribs., 55 Bankr. 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1985) (because contempt power resulting from a party's failure to comply with an order of the
bankruptcy court is a core proceeding arising in a bankruptcy action in an appropriate order to
effectuate the bankruptcy code, the power to issue such a contempt order is conferred on bankruptcy judges); In re Depew, 51 Bankr. 1010, 1014 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (the integrity and
efficacy of the automatic stay as a fundamental debtor protection device requires contempt actions
arising out of the automatic stay to be classified as a core proceeding).
197. 284 U.S. 448 (1932).
198. Id. at 454.
199. Miller, 81 Bankr. at 679.
200. Id. at 675 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)).
201. Miller, 81 Bankr. at 676 (citing Boyd v. Glucklick, 116 F. 131 (8th Cir. 1902)).
202. 116 F. 131 (8th Cir. 1902).
203. Id. at 135.
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lawful judicial orders." 04 Furthermore, the Miller court recognized
"the judicial power to issue an order carries with it the power to en20 5
force the order.
Although a number of courts still adhere to the restrictive approach, it does not seem to represent the trend of authority. Two
months after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sequoia, the same court
handed down an opinion more conducive to the expansive approach. 0 6
In Gonzalez v. Parks,20 7 the Ninth Circuit held that bankruptcy courts
are vested with authority to issue sanctions upon a party who violates
rules governing bankruptcy procedure, as well as the authority to impose a fine on such a party.20 8 Such a fine may be viewed as analogous
to a sanction imposed for civil contempt.20 9 The Miller decision's response to Gonzalez was that "[i]f the imposition of sanctions for violat[ion of a] procedural rule is proper, it is hardly understandable why
[under the Sequoia decision] a violation of a specific provision of the
Bankruptcy Code cannot be sanctioned by a judicial officer who is
granted full and complete jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code . . ,.1o
While the Sequoia decision is still followed by some courts,21 1 the
trend of authority, at least among bankruptcy courts which have ruled
on the issue, seems to follow the expansive approach, 1 and to a lesser

204. Miller, 81 Bankr. at 679.
205. Id.
206. See Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1987).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1035.
209. Miller, 81 Bankr. at 678.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., In re Moody, 64 Bankr. 594, 596 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (power of contempt is not classified as a core proceeding, and therefore bankruptcy courts have no final authority on such a matter); In re Continental Airlines, 61 Bankr. 758, 773 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
212. In re Clark, 91 Bankr. 324, 333 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (the use of section 105(a) to
support a means of enforcement of bankruptcy court's orders through contempt appears eminently
supportable); Haile v. Higher Educ. Servs., 90 Bankr. 51, 54 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1988) (contempt
power is a core proceeding, the determination of which properly rests within the purview of the
bankruptcy judge); In re Bowen, 89 Bankr. 800, 807 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (the more wellreasoned rule is that 11 U.S.C. § 105 confers full civil contempt power on bankruptcy judges); In
re Newport Offshore, 88 Bankr. 566, 571 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1988) (section 105(a)'s broad grant of
power to bankruptcy courts clearly encompasses issuance of a civil contempt order); In re Hamilton Allied Corp., 87 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (even if contempt power in a non-article
IlIcourt is not inherent, there are at least three sources of authority to support a finding of
jurisdiction for bankruptcy courts in the matter of contempt: II U.S.C. § 105(a); 28 U.S.C. §
157(b); and Bankruptcy Rule 9020); Yaquinto v. Greer, 81 Bankr. 870, 880-81 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1988) (bankruptcy court has at least civil contempt power, but no court has held that bankruptcy court has criminal contempt power); In re Kennedy, 80 Bankr. 673, 674 (Bankr. D. Del.
1987) ("It would be anomalous that [a bankruptcy] court should not have the power to enforce
obedience to that kind of judgment and order by civil contempt but merely find the the disobeying
party in contempt
and report 1988
it to the District court"); Kellogg v. Chester, 71 Bankr. 36, 37
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degree, the inherent power approach. " ' Of these three diverse lines of
reasoning, the expansive approach is the most acceptable, provided
some clarifications and modifications are made.
The expansive approach should be interpreted as a grant of civil
contempt power to bankruptcy courts, but should not be construed so
far as to give such courts the power to issue criminal contempt citations,2 14 except when the contemptuous act is committed in the court's
presence."" This would enable a bankruptcy court to enforce compliance with its orders, while at the same time minimize the potential for
abuse of such an "awesome power." 2 Such an interpretation would
also permit a bankruptcy court to vindicate its authority because the
judge can still find a party in criminal contempt for actions committed
in the presence of the court.
Such a rule would also fit nicely within the core/non-core proceedings distinction which defines a bankruptcy court's statutory authority.
The United States Supreme Court reasoned in Leman that civil contempt proceedings are part of the underlying cause of action between
the parties.21 7 It therefore logically follows that civil contempt proceedings fit within the definition of core proceedings.21 There are also policy reasons for allowing bankruptcy courts to assert the power of civil

(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (bankruptcy courts are statutorily granted the power to issue final contempt orders); In re Haddad, 68 Bankr. 944, 953 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) ("it would border on
legal hallucination" to hold that bankruptcy courts may not issue civil contempt powers); In re
McLean Indus., 68 Bankr. 690, 695 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("All courts, whether created pursuant to [a]rticle I or [airticle II, have inherent contempt power to enforce compliance with their
lawful orders."); In re L.H. & A. Realty, 62 Bankr. 910, 917 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) (incidental to
a bankruptcy court's authority to render final decisions in core proceedings is the implicit power to
enforce such orders); In re Industrial Tool Distribs., 55 Bankr. 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985) (contempt power resulting from a party's failure to comply with a bankruptcy judge's order is a core
proceeding); In re Crum, 55 Bankr. 455, 458 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (a bankruptcy court is
availed with statutory power of contempt in order to be able to "put teeth into its power to enforce
its orders"); In re Better Homes of Virginia, 52 Bankr. 426, 430-31 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985)
(bankruptcy court has power to issue contempt citations in order to protect administration of the
bankruptcy code), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986) In re Depew, 51 Bankr.
1010, 1014 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (the integrity and efficacy of the automatic stay as a fundamental debtor protection device requires a contempt action arising out of violation of the stay to
be classified as a core proceeding).
213. See, e.g., In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 95 Bankr. 860, 863 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989) (both
article I and article III courts have inherent power to enforce obedience of their orders through
contempt); In re Skinner, 90 Bankr. 470, 475 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988) (noting that bankruptcy
judges have inherent contempt power).
214. See, e.g., Yaquinto v. Greer, 81 Bankr. 870, 880-881 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (bankruptcy courts have civil, but not criminal contempt power).
215. Cf. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020(b).
216. See In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, 827 F.2d at 1285 (citing Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S.
289 (1888)).
217. Leman, 284 U.S. at 448.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/6
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
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contempt. A bankruptcy court must be availed of this power in order to
be able to "put teeth into its power to enforce its orders."'21 To hold
otherwise would encourage disobedience to the orders of the bankruptcy judge since there would be no real threat of force behind the
orders.
Criminal contempt proceedings fall under the statutory definition
of non-core proceedings22 because such proceedings are separate and
apart from the underlying transaction.2 2 1 For policy reasons, however,
criminal contempts committed in the presence of the bankruptcy court
should be considered core proceedings because they occur during the
proceedings themselves and there is a need for the court to vindicate its
authority for such contemptuous acts. This concern may have been the
motivation behind Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9020, which
permits a bankruptcy court to punish contempts committed in its
222
presence.
Such a rule as that advocated above would recognize the bankruptcy court for what it is: an article I court not fully empowered with
article III status but with sufficient authority to require obedience by
the parties appearing before it. Therefore, the constitutional concerns
emphasized in the Northern Pipeline decision would be served because
there would not be impermissible removal of traditional powers of an
article III court to a non-article III entity.
At least one commentator believes that depriving bankruptcy
courts of the power to hold a party in contempt would denegrate the
judicial character of that office. 223 This would in turn result in an inability to attract the most highly qualified attorneys who seek judgeships. 22 " The bankruptcy judges would be viewed as little more than
clerks for their respective district courts, and lawyers would therefore
be unwilling to sacrifice private practice for such a position.2 25
Moreover, to hold that bankruptcy courts may not wield contempt
power would be to contravene the purpose of modern bankruptcy legislation, as well as the policy behind the imposition of civil contempt.
Bankruptcy law is designed to provide debtors with "a new opportunity
in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of pre-existing debt. ' 22 6 This goal can hardly be
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See In re Crum, 55 Bankr. 455, 458 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020(b).
See Norton & Lieb, supra note 75, at 349.
Id.
Id.
Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S.
234, 244-45
(1934)).
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effectuated if a debtor is needlessly required to undergo expenditures
from his estate on a hearing de novo by the district court when there is
no compelling reason not to allow bankruptcy courts to wield such
power. Also, the purpose of civil contempt is to benefit the aggrieved
party.22 7 The aggrieved party can hardly benefit if he is required to
undergo the cost and delay of the certification process.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although a few courts believe that the Supreme Court's decision
22
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
precludes bankruptcy judges from exercising contempt powers, the
Court's subsequent decisions in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co. 29 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor2 30 seemed to retreat from this position. These decisions indicated
the High Court had modified its hard-line approach in Northern Pipeline and adopted more of an ad hoc approach as was endorsed by Justice White's dissent in that case. However, in Granfindnciera,S.A. Vi.
Nordberg,23 1 the Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding the
matter, the Court seemed to revert back to its hard-line approach in
Northern Pipeline, by refusing to defer to Congress' determination that
an action to recover a fraudulent conveyance was a "core" proceeding.
The majority's opinion was however, sharply criticized by Justice
White's dissent, which expressed the need for deference to Congress in
exercising its constitutional power to regulate bankruptcy. The High
Court should defer to the legislative enactments of Congress wherever
possible in this area. To do otherwise would be to engage in extreme
judicial activism and would frustrate the purposes of article I of the
Constitution.
At least one federal appeals court and the majority of bankruptcy
court decisions hold that Congress has authorized bankruptcy judges to
issue contempt citations under section 105(a) of title 11, granting
bankruptcy courts the power to issue any order necessary or appropri32
ate to enforce the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and under section 157(b) of title 28, granting bankruptcy judges the authority to is2 33 The United States
sue final orders in all "core" proceedings.
Supreme Court's decision in Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last

227. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-370 (1966).
228. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
229. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
230. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
231. 109 S. Ct. 2782 (interim ed. 1989).
232. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1986).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/6
233. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1986).
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Co."' 4 holds that civil contempt actions are part of the original cause of
action between the parties. Therefore civil contempt proceedings
are
core proceedings over which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
to
render final orders, subject only to conventional appeal. The power
of
the bankruptcy court should also be interpreted to allow it to hold parties in criminal contempt for contemptuous acts committed in its presence. This is necessary in order to vindicate the court's authority and
encourage respect for the court.
Holding that bankruptcy judges do not possess the power to issue
final contempt orders would be tantamount to classifying the office as
a
clerkship. Thus the position would not attract the most highly qualified
bankruptcy attorneys. Moreover, to hold that a bankruptcy court must
certify de novo any findings of contempt to the district court will
encumber an overloaded federal court system and produce a result contrary to the purpose of bankruptcy law which is to provide a debtor
with a new opportunity unhampered by pre-existing debt. This purpose
would be thwarted if a debtor and creditor alike are required to make
unnecessary expenditures and undergo delays in the certification process to the district court. It would be ludicrous to require the parties
to
undergo these hardships when there is no compelling reason to deprive
bankruptcy courts of the power to issue final contempt orders. Both the
court system and the parties to a bankruptcy case would benefit
if
bankruptcy judges were held to have the power of civil contempt,
as
well as limited power to adjudge criminal contempt.
Richard C. Howard Jr.
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